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Abstract
I study the welfare gains from commitment relative to discretion in the context of an
equilibrium model that features deep habits in consumption. Policy simulations reveal
that the welfare gains are increasing in the degree of habit formation and economically
signicant for a range of values consistent with U.S. data. I trace these results to
the supply-side eects that deep habits impart on the economy and show that they
ultimately weaken the stabilization trade-os facing a discretionary planner. Most of
the ineciencies from discretion, it turns out, can be avoided by installing commitment
regimes that last just two years or less. Extending the commitment horizon further
delivers marginal welfare gains that are trivial by comparison.
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1 Introduction
Habit formation has become a xture of modern equilibrium models of the business cycle.
Most take the view that households form habits from consumption of a single aggregate
good. That the aggregate good is itself composed of dierentiated products, however, raises
the question of whether it might be preferable to model consumption habits directly at the
level of individual good varieties.
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) adopt this view of preferences, which they de-
scribe as \deep habits," and show that it has two major implications for aggregate dynamics.
First, the consumption Euler equation turns out to be identical to the one derived from a
traditional habit-persistence model. The essential role that this equation plays in matching
certain empirical regularities, notably, consumption and asset-price dynamics, should thus
carry over to a deep habits setting as well.1 Second, unlike aggregate-level habits, deep habits
alter rms' pricing decisions in a way that gives rise to countercyclical mark-ups in equi-
librium. Not only is this observation consistent with U.S. experience (e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1999; Mazumder, 2014), recent studies have demonstrated that it also strength-
ens the model's internal propagation mechanisms. Ravn et al. (2006) show that by inducing
countercyclical mark-ups, deep habits can account for the observed procyclical responses of
consumption and wages to a government spending shock. When grafted into a sticky-price
framework, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2010), Lubik and Teo (2014), and
Givens (2015) nd that deep habits impart substantial inertia on ination, thereby lessening
the need for dubious features like backward indexation or high levels of exogenous rigidity.2
In light of these and other empirical successes, it is surprising that the literature has had
relatively little to say about the normative implications of deep habits. I take up this task
here with an application to optimal monetary policy. Specically, I compute and then ana-
lyze the welfare dierential between optimal commitment and discretion using a sticky-price
equilibrium model that gives prominence to deep habits in consumption. In the context
of rational expectations, discretionary policy suers from a well-known \stabilization bias"
(e.g., Woodford, 2003), a dynamic ineciency that distorts the volatility of the economy's
1Standard models of habit formation have been used to resolve the equity premium puzzle (e.g., Abel,
1990; Constantinides, 1990) as well as the risk-free-rate puzzle (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). They
also appear frequently in medium-scale DSGE models to generate the \hump-shaped" responses of aggregate
consumption and output to various economic shocks identied in the data (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007).
2Zubairy (2014b) shows that deep habits provide a transmission channel for government spending shocks
powerful enough to create multiplier eects consistent with estimates found in the VAR literature.
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response to unexpected shocks. Policymakers can reverse these distortions and, in the pro-
cess, advance the welfare of private agents by switching to optimal commitment. The extent
to which commitment increases welfare, however, is plainly model dependent. So in prac-
tice, establishing whether the gains are large or small is ultimately an empirical matter. The
superior t displayed by models containing deep habits suggests that they could provide
credible information on the potential size of these gains in the real world.
The case for estimating the gains from commitment using only data-consistent models
was rst made by Dennis and Soderstrom (2006) who argued that such information is critical
in deciding whether public investments in the economy's commitment technology justify the
costs. To provide context, the authors estimated the welfare gap using several famous empir-
ical models and found substantial variation among them. Obscuring their results, however,
is the fact that the models featured in the study lack coherent microeconomic foundations
and, as such, are incapable of providing an ideal measure of social welfare consistent with
household preferences. As a result, the authors took the usual step of articulating social
welfare through an exogenously-specied loss function dened over the weighted variances of
ination, the output gap, and nominal interest rate smoothing (e.g., Rudebusch and Svens-
son, 1999). But without explicit reference to private utility, it is doubtful that such an
objective function encapsulates the true welfare cost of discretion.
I avoid this critique here by employing the correct measure of welfare based on a quadratic
approximation of the average household's utility function. As shown by Leith, Moldovan,
and Rossi (2012), it is possible to write the approximation as a particular weighted sum of
three terms: squares of ination, the output gap, and the \habit-adjusted" output gap (i.e.,
deviations from Pareto-ecient levels). To compute the welfare dierentials, I maximize
this criterion separately under commitment and discretion and record the value function in
both cases. Gaps between the two are then converted into units of consumption in order to
provide a tangible interpretation of the losses generated by the stabilization bias.
Of course, outcomes under commitment and discretion will dier only insofar as the
structural model implies meaningful trade-os between ination and output gap stability. I
bring up this point because the conventional sticky-price framework has long been criticized
on exactly these grounds. Indeed, in the standard model, any policy that stabilizes ination
also stabilizes the output gap (e.g., Blanchard and Gal, 2007). Some common procedures
for overcoming this so-called \divine coincidence" include putting extraneous supply shocks
in the Phillips Curve (e.g., Clarida, Gal, and Gertler, 1999) or an interest rate variability
term in the objective function (e.g., Amato and Laubach, 2004). These kinds of arbitrary
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extensions to the model, however, are unnecessary here. As explained by Leith et al. (2012),
incorporating deep habits elicits an endogenous policy trade-o between ination and the
two output gap concepts described above. Such a trade-o emerges because the consump-
tion externality induced by habit formation drives a wedge between the exible-price (zero
adjustment cost) equilibrium and the ecient equilibrium. Thus any shock to the economy{
whether it be a preference or a productivity shock{creates tension between two separate
policy goals in the short run: minimizing price adjustment costs and neutralizing the habit
externality. The former is achieved by holding ination equal to target ination and the
latter by aligning output with its ecient level (i.e., a zero output gap).
Policy simulations carried out in this paper conrm that the welfare dierential between
commitment and discretion is strictly increasing in the degree of deep habits and economi-
cally signicant for a range of values that span known estimates. At the habit value estimated
by Ravn et al. (2006), for example, the gap is equivalent to 0:188 percent of consumption,
or about $90 per person per year. Most of the gains from commitment, it turns out, trace
directly to the restrictions that deep habits impose on the log-linearized Phillips Curve equa-
tion. There one sees that the main forcing process for ination depends positively on the
real interest rate in addition to rms' marginal cost of production. This means that adjust-
ments to the interest rate will have immediate supply-side eects on ination that counteract
the familiar demand-side eects of policy on marginal cost. Such opposing inuences will
obviously frustrate eorts to stabilize ination under either policy. Quantitative results
show, however, that these adverse supply-side eects, which become stronger as deep habits
intensify, are easier to manage with commitment than with discretion.
The full commitment program considered thus far requires that the policy authority
implement{in all future periods{the procedures specied by an optimal state-contingent
plan. A natural question then is whether, or to what extent, increases in welfare can be
achieved with a policy that mimics this behavior for a limited rather than indenite number
of periods. The quasi -commitment equilibrium concept developed by Schaumberg and Tam-
balotti (2007) provides a means of answering this question. Under quasi-commitment, the
government defaults on its policy obligations (i.e., it re-optimizes) with some constant and
exogenous probability known to the public. Outcomes converge to full commitment as the
probability gets close to zero but to pure discretion as it nears one. Values inside the unit
interval, however, connect these two extremes with a continuum of intermediate policies that
vary by frequency of re-optimizations or, put dierently, by the average duration of commit-
ment regimes. Simulations of the deep habits model under quasi-commitment reveal that
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most of the gains identied in the benchmark analysis are attainable with commitments last-
ing no more than two years on average. Further increases in the durability of commitments
produces marginal welfare gains that are much smaller by comparison.
2 The Model
Economic activity results from interaction between optimizing households and imperfectly
competitive rms that manufacture dierentiated products and face costs of changing prices.
2.1 Households
There is a unit measure of households, indexed by j, that gain utility from consuming a
composite of dierentiated goods xj;t and lose utility from supplying labor hj;t. Following
Ravn et al. (2006), households develop external consumption habits at the level of individual
good varieties. This so-called \deep habits" arrangement assumes that the composite good
takes the form
xj;t =
Z 1
0
(cj;t(i)  bct 1(i))1 1= di
1=(1 1=)
; (1)
where cj;t(i) is consumption of good i by household j and ct(i) 
R 1
0
cj;t(i)dj is the population
mean consumption of the same item. The parameter  > 1 determines the intratemporal
substitution elasticity across (habit-adjusted) varieties, and b 2 [0; 1) measures the strength
of habit formation. For b > 0, preferences feature \catching up with the Joneses" a la Abel
(1990) but on a good-by-good basis. Setting b = 0 removes deep habits from the model, and
with it, the consumption externality that creates trade-os for optimal stabilization policy.
Every period household j minimizes
R 1
0
Pt(i)cj;t(i)di subject to the aggregation constraint
(1). First-order conditions imply demand functions of the form
cj;t(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
xj;t + bct 1(i);
where Pt(i) is the price of good i and Pt 
hR 1
0
Pt(i)
1 di
i1=(1 )
is the price of the composite
good. Note that demand for good i depends on past aggregate sales ct 1(i) as long as b > 0.
Households take this quantity as given when allocating expenditures across product varieties.
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Intertemporal spending decisions are made with reference to a lifetime utility function
Vj;0 = E0
1X
t=0
tat
"
x1 j;t
1    
h1+j;t
1 + 
#
; (2)
where E0 is a date-0 expectations operator and  2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor.
Parameter  > 0 governs the intertemporal elasticity of consumption and  > 0 the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Preference shocks at aect all households symmetrically and follow
the autoregressive process log at = a log at 1 + "a;t, with jaj < 1 and "a;t  i.i.d. (0; 2a).
Households enter each period with riskless one-period bond holdings Bj;t 1 that pay
a gross nominal interest rate Rt 1 at date t. They also provide labor services to rms
at a competitive nominal wage rate Wt and, after production, receive dividends j;t from
ownership of those rms. The period-t budget constraint is
Ptxj;t +$t +Bj;t  Rt 1Bj;t 1 + (1  )Wthj;t + j;t + Tj;t; (3)
where $t  b
R 1
0
Pt(i)ct 1(i)di.3 Sequences fxj;t; hj;t; Bj;tg1t=0 are chosen to maximize Vj;0
subject to (3) and a no-Ponzi requirement, taking as given fat; Pt; $t; Rt 1;Wt;j;t; Tj;tg1t=0
and initial assets Bj; 1. The rst-order conditions satisfy
1 = Et
Rt
t+1
at+1
at

xj;t
xj;t+1

; (4)
hj;tx

j;t = wt(1  ); (5)
where wt  Wt=Pt is the real wage and t  Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination rate.
Equation (4) is the Euler equation for (habit-adjusted) consumption, and (5) is an ef-
ciency condition linking the marginal rate of substitution to the real wage. Notice that
the tax rate  2 [0; 1] on labor income drives a wedge between these two quantities. As ex-
plained in Leith et al. (2012), taxes are used to fund lump-sum transfers Tj;t to households,
and the value of  is chosen so that steady-state allocations are Pareto ecient despite the
distortionary eects of habit externalities. Such a tax enables one to obtain a valid quadratic
approximation of expected utility when evaluated using only a linear approximation of the
model's equilibrium conditions (e.g., Woodford, 2003).
3Household j's eorts to minimize the cost of assembling each unit of xj;t implies that, at the optimum,R 1
0
Pt(i)cj;t(i)di = Ptxj;t + b
R 1
0
Pt(i)ct 1(i)di.
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2.2 Firms
Good i is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm with technology yt(i) = ztht(i),
where yt(i) is the output of rm i and ht(i) its use of labor. Technology shocks zt are common
to all rms and follow log zt = z log zt 1 + "z;t, with jzj < 1 and "z;t  i.i.d. (0; 2z).
Firms maximize the present value of prot subject to
ct(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
xt + bct 1(i); (6)
a market demand curve obtained by integrating cj;t(i) over all j 2 [0; 1] households.4 Firms
stand ready to meet demand at the posted price, so ztht(i)  ct(i) for all t  0. Individual
prices may be reset every period, but at a cost. Following Rotemberg (1982), rms pay
adjustment costs of the form (=2) [Pt(i)=Pt 1(i)  1]2 yt, measured in units of aggregate
output yt 
R 1
0
yt(i)di, anytime growth in Pt(i) deviates from the long-run mean ination
rate . The constant   0 determines the size of price adjustment costs.
The Lagrangian of rm i's maximization problem is
L = E0
1X
t=0
q0;t
(
Pt(i)ct(i) Wtht(i)  
2

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1
2
Ptyt
+Ptmct(i) [ztht(i)  ct(i)] + Ptt(i)
"
Pt(i)
Pt
 
xt + bct 1(i)  ct(i)
#)
;
where q0;t is a stochastic discount factor.
5 Sequences fht(i); ct(i); Pt(i)g1t=0 are chosen to
maximize L, taking as given fq0;t;Wt; Pt; yt; zt; xtg1t=0 and initial values c 1(i) and P 1(i).
The rst-order conditions are
wt = mct(i)zt; (7)
t(i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
 mct(i) + bEt q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1t+1(i); (8)
4xt 
R 1
0
xj;tdj.
5In equilibrium the stochastic discount factor satises q0;tPt = 
tatx
 
t . It is interpreted as the date-0
utility value of consuming an additional unit of the composite good at date t.
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ct(i) = t(i)

Pt(i)
Pt
  1
xt + 

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1

Ptyt
Pt 1(i)
  Et q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1

Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
  1

Pt+1(i)Ptyt+1
Pt(i)2
: (9)
The multiplier mct(i) in (7) corresponds to real marginal cost. The multiplier t(i) in (8)
is the shadow value of selling an extra unit of good i. It equals the prot generated by the
sale of that unit in period t, Pt(i)=Pt mct(i), plus all discounted future prot that the sale
is expected to yield via habit formation, bEt
q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1t+1(i). Without consumption habits
(b = 0), t(i) just equals current marginal prot. The third optimality condition (9) equates
the costs and benets of unit changes to the rm's relative price Pt(i)=Pt.
2.3 Government
The government has a dual role in the model. First, it taxes labor income and remits the
proceeds to households as lump-sum transfers. There is no government spending and no
public debt, so Wthj;t = Tj;t for all j 2 [0; 1]. Second, it conducts monetary policy by
adjusting the nominal interest rate Rt. Policy outcomes are optimal in that they maximize
(under commitment or discretion) a second order approximation to V0 
R 1
0
Vj;0dj.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium households make identical spending and labor supply choices
and rms charge the same price. It follows that subscript j and argument i can be dropped
from the constraints and optimality conditions.6 Equilibrium also requires imposing relevant
market-clearing conditions. Balancing the supply and demand for labor means
R 1
0
hj;tdj =R 1
0
ht(i)di  ht for t  0. In product markets, supply of the nal good equals demand from
consumption plus resources spent on adjustment costs, so yt = ct + (=2)(t=   1)2yt.
2.5 Calibration
Table 1 reports benchmark numerical values for the structural parameters. Most are similar
to ones appearing in other studies that build deep consumption habits into sticky-price
models of the business cycle (e.g., Leith et al., 2012; Zubairy, 2014a; Lubik and Teo, 2014).
6The full set of competitive equilibrium conditions can be found in the appendix.
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Table 1
Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Description Value
 subjective discount factor 1:03 1=4
 inverse intertemporal substitution elasticity 2
 inverse (Frisch) labor supply elasticity 0:25
b degree of deep habit formation 0:65
 intratemporal substitution elasticity across goods 6
 price adjustment cost 29:565
a standard deviation of preference shocks 0:0389
a persistence of preference shocks 0:5254
z standard deviation of technology shocks 0:0215
z persistence of technology shocks 0:9088
The unit of time is one quarter. The discount factor  is set to 1:03 1=4, implying a
steady-state annual real interest rate of 3 percent. Utility parameters,  and , are xed so
that the model delivers an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1=) equal to one-half
and a Frisch labor supply elasticity (1=) equal to four. Both values are broadly consistent
with estimates drawn from medium-scale DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003;
Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams, 2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010).
The habit parameter b is initially set equal to 0:65. While this is a bit smaller than what
recent empirical evidence suggests, it is close to the benchmark value in Leith et al. (2012).7
In most of the policy experiments discussed below, I vary b on the interval [0; 1) since the
goal here is to scrutinize how the gains from commitment are aected by deep habits.
The substitution elasticity  along with  and b jointly determine rms' steady-state
mark-up.8 I set the value of  to 6, implying an average mark-up of 20:33 percent under
the benchmark calibration. However, mark-ups can range from 20 and 23 percent depending
on the size of b. As for adjustment costs, I x  so that the model is consistent with
a price-change frequency of 9 months in a Calvo-Yun framework. In the absence of deep
habits, the Phillips Curve coecient on real marginal cost, obtained by log-linearizing (9)
around the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium (see section 3.2), is (   1)=. Equating
this term to its counterpart in a Calvo-Yun Phillips Curve and solving for  gives  =
(   1)=(1   )(1   ), where 1    is the reset probability. Setting  = 2=3 implies an
7Estimates of b found in Ravn et al. (2006), Ravn et al. (2010), and Lubik and Teo (2014) span 0:85 to
0:86. Point estimates obtained by Givens (2015) put the value closer to 0:94.
8The steady-state mark-up of price over marginal cost, 1=mc, satises mc = 1  (1=)(1  b)=(1  b).
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Table 2
Model t
(^t) (c^t) (R^t) (^t;c^t) (^t; R^t) (c^t; R^t) (^t; ^t 1) (c^t;c^t 1) (R^t; R^t 1)
Data 0:5028 0:6137 0:8238  0:1244 0:6456 0:0711 0:6527 0:2839 0:9735
Model 0:5409 0:6042 0:8054  0:1116 0:6585 0:0685 0:5429 0:3668 0:8428
Notes: Sample is 1980:Q1-2014:Q4. (Xt) = variance of Xt; (Xt; Zt) = contemporaneous correlation between Xt and Zt;
(Xt; Xt 1) = rst-order autocorrelation of Xt. The sample Taylor rule is R^t = 0:6927^t + 0:4418c^t + 0:7961R^t 1, and the
value of the objective function


Y (	^)  
^Y
0 

Y (	^)  
^Y

= 0:0382.
average price duration of 3 quarters and is equivalent to  = 29:56 in the present model.
To obtain values for the parameters characterizing preference and technology shocks, I
use a simplied version of the estimation program outlined in Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011). In short, values for (a, a, z, z) are chosen to match, as closely as possible,
a small set of contemporaneous and intertemporal covariances of the model's observable
variables with corresponding moments from U.S. data. There are three variables in the
deep habits model for which macroeconomic time-series data are available: the growth rate
of consumption, the ination rate, and the nominal interest rate. To compute moments
for these variables, I rst log-linearize the equilibrium conditions and solve for the unique
rational expectations equilibrium (e.g., Klein, 2000). I then extract the relevant moments
from the reduced-form representation of the model. This exercise obviously requires making
an assumption about monetary policy. Here I assume that interest rates are set according
to a Taylor-type rule of the form R^t = ^t + c(c^t   c^t 1) + RR^t 1, which allows policy
to respond to current levels of ination and consumption growth and lagged levels of the
interest rate.9 The policy-rule coecients, together with the stochastic shocks, are picked to
minimize the discrepancy between select model moments and their sample counterparts.
Denote 	 = (a; a; z; z; ; c; R) the subset of parameters to be estimated via method-
of-moments and Yt = [^t c^t R^t]
0 the vector of observables.10 In estimating 	, I focus only
on matching the variances of ^t, c^t, and R^t, the contemporaneous correlations between
them, and the rst-order autocorrelations for each. The formal estimate of 	 is
	^ = argmin
	


Y (	)  
^Y
0 

Y (	)  
^Y

;
where 
Y (	) are theoretical moments computed for a given 	 and 
^Y are the corresponding
9For any variable Xt, X^t  logXt   logX, the log deviation of Xt from its steady-state value X.
10 is a rst-dierence operator.
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sample moments.11 Holding the rest of the structural parameters xed at their benchmark
values, estimates of the law of motion for preference shocks are a = 0:5254 and a = 0:0389.
Estimates of the technology shock process are z = 0:9088 and z = 0:0215. Both sets are
listed in Table 1. The values of 
Y (	^) and 
^Y are reported in Table 2.
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3 Optimal Policy
The central task of this paper is to assess the gains from commitment relative to discretion
using a modeling framework that gives prominence to deep consumption habits. The last
section described the full model of private behavior and established plausible numerical values
for the structural parameters. The next step is to specify the government's optimization
problem so that equilibrium welfare under the two policies can be compared.
3.1 Policy Objectives
The welfare criterion used to quantify the gains from precommitment is given by a second-
order Taylor series expansion of households' expected lifetime utility. As shown by Leith et
al. (2012), a quadratic approximation to (2) can be written as
V0 =  1
2
h1+E0
1X
t=0
t

^2t + (y^t   y^et )2 +
(1  b)
1  b (x^t   x^
e
t )
2

+ t:i:p:+O(k"k3); (10)
where k"k is a bound on the amplitude of preference and technology shocks, O(k"k3) are
terms in the expansion that are of third order or higher, and t:i:p: collects terms that are
independent of monetary policy.13 The quantities in (10) that depend on policy include
squares of ination as well as two dierent output gap variables, namely, deviations of actual
and habit-adjusted output from their Pareto-ecient levels, denoted yet and x
e
t , respectively.
That both output gap terms appear separately in the policy objective function is a direct
consequence of habit formation. As b approaches zero, the two terms fold into a single
11
Y  [var(^) var(c^) var(R^) corr(^;c^) corr(^; R^) corr(c^; R^) corr(^; ^ 1) corr(c^;c^ 1) corr(R^; R^ 1)]0.
12The sample covers U.S. data from 1980:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Consumption growth is log(RPCEt=POPt)  
log(RPCEt 1=POPt 1), where RPCE is chained Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) and
POP is the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Ination equals log(Pt=Pt 1) and is constructed using
the chain-type price index for PCE. The interest rate is log(1 + TBt=100)
1=4, where TB is the secondary
market rate on 3-Month Treasury Bills. All three variables are de-meaned prior estimation. Average annual
ination over the sample is 2:75 percent. I use this value to calibrate steady-state ination in the model.
13A derivation of the quadratic welfare criterion can be found in the appendix.
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objective given by (+ ) (y^t   y^et )2, in the process simplifying (10) to the familiar welfare
measure associated with the basic sticky-price model discussed in Woodford (2003).
The fact that ination and the output gap variables enter the objective function strictly
as second-order terms is important because it means that their expected values can be
computed from a simple log-linear approximation to the model's equilibrium conditions.
Following Leith et al. (2012), the linear-quadratic nature of the problem is made possible by
the use of a tax  on labor income that renders the steady-state allocations Pareto ecient.
Since adjustment costs are zero in the steady state, the tax eliminates only the net distortions
caused by habit externalities and market power. Under the benchmark calibration, this is
accomplished with a tax rate of 57:31 percent.14
3.2 Policy Constraints
The government conducts monetary policy by setting R^t to maximize the approximate wel-
fare criterion described above. The constraints on policy are given by the log-linearized
equilibrium conditions of the deep habits model, which for the sake of clarity I present in
Table 3. Because the constraints are forward looking, whether the government can credibly
commit to a sequence of actions, or whether policy decisions are made independently every
period (i.e., discretion), has a big impact on the economy. If commitments are feasible,
interest rates evolve according to an optimal state-contingent rule. In designing such a rule,
the government internalizes the eect of its own choices on the expected future variables
in (M-1){(M-7). The result is a socially optimal equilibrium in which policy makes e-
cient use of private-sector beliefs to achieve the stabilization goals embodied by (10). By
contrast, outcomes under discretion are not the ones prescribed by some xed contingency
rule. Every period a discretionary optimizer resets policy in response to current conditions,
taking agents' beliefs about the future as given. The equilibrium is only optimal in a limited
sense because absent commitment the government cannot harness expectations in a way that
eases its stabilization trade-os. This inability to manage expectations is the source of the
stabilization bias of discretionary policy discussed earlier. Computational programs used to
solve for equilibria under commitment and discretion are taken from Soderlind (1999).
14Setting  = 1   (1=mc)(1   b) ensures that the decentralized allocations are Pareto-optimal in the
steady state. See Leith et al. (2012) for a more detailed discussion of this result.
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Table 3
Log-linearized deep habits model
Goods demand x^t = Etx^t+1   (1=)[R^t   Et^t+1   (1  a)a^t] (M-1)
Composite good x^t = (1=(1  b))y^t   (b=(1  b))y^t 1 (M-2)
Real marginal cost m^ct = x^t + y^t   (1 + )z^t (M-3)
Shadow value of sales ^t = b[Et^t+1   (R^t   Et^t+1)]  [(1  b)  (1  b)]m^ct (M-4)
Phillips Curve ^t = Et^t+1 + (1=)[y^t   ^t   x^t] (M-5)
Pareto goods demand x^et = bEtx^
e
t+1   (1=)[(1  b)(y^et   (1 + )z^t)  b(1  a)a^t] (M-6)
Pareto composite good x^et = (1=(1  b))y^et   (b=(1  b))y^et 1 (M-7)
3.3 Welfare Gaps
In the next section I quantify the welfare gap between discretion and commitment. One
way to measure the gap is by computing the percentage gain in welfare that accompanies a
switch from the former policy to the latter. This quantity is given by 100   1  V c0 =V d0 ,
where V c0 and V
d
0 are the maximal values of (10) obtained under commitment and discretion.
The percentage gain metric, however, is hard to interpret because it involves only indirect
utility values. I therefore consider a second concept that translates V c0 and V
d
0 into units
of consumption. Specically, I compute the drop in the consumption path associated with
commitment needed to balance welfare under the two policies. This quantity, call it , is
dened by
E

V d0

= E
1X
t=0
tat
"
((1  )xct)1 
1    
(hct)
1+
1 + 
#
; (11)
where fxct ; hctg1t=0 are sequences for consumption and work hours under commitment and E is
an unconditional expectations operator.15 The value of  puts into perspective the magnitude
of the welfare gap between commitment and discretion caused by the stabilization bias.
4 Welfare Analysis
Having discussed the government's stabilization goals and the procedural dierences be-
tween commitment and discretion, I can now analyze the extent to which the gains from
commitment are aected by deep habits.
15I adopt the usual method of identifying  with the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility. This
means  will depend on the distribution of the initial state rather than an assumed value for the initial state.
12
4.1 Gains from Commitment
The focal point of the analysis is Fig. 1, which plots the welfare dierential expressed in
units of consumption for values of b 2 [0; 0:94].16 The solid line corresponds to the deep
habits model. Consider rst the benchmark calibration. When b = 0:65, the gap between
commitment and discretion is equivalent to 0:0247 percent of consumption. Per capita U.S.
nominal consumption expenditures was $48; 674:47 (annualized) in the last quarter of 2014,
so a loss of 0:0247 percent amounts to $12:02 per person per year. In comparison, Leith et
al. (2012) estimate the welfare gap to be 0:0047 percent of consumption, or $2:26 per person.
The dierence here can be traced to the fact that the current model allows for shocks to
preferences as well as total factor productivity. Leith's model contains only the latter. It
turns out that both supply and demand-side shocks generate trade-os for a policymaker
faced with stabilizing ination in addition to the output gap (see section 4.3). Removing
one of the shocks lessens the tension between these objectives, in the process narrowing the
gap between precommitment and discretionary outcomes.
The results also show that  varies greatly with the size of the habit parameter. When
b is one-half, the gap between commitment and discretion is equivalent to 0:0073 percent of
consumption or $3:58. Lowering b to 0:25 reduces  to a mere 0:0007 percent.17 Moving in
the opposite direction I nd that the value of commitment increases dramatically as habits
strengthen. Shifting b from 0:8 to 0:9 raises  from 0:0915 to 0:3603 percent, that is, from
$44:53 to $175:38 per person. The gap balloons to almost $400 when b nears the upper bound
of the parameter space. Given the sensitivity of these ndings, locating empirically relevant
values for b is critical for obtaining a reliable estimate of . Studies that have attempted to
estimate the degree of deep habits indicate that the true value is probably close to 0:86 (e.g.,
Ravn et al., 2006; Lubik and Teo, 2014). Evaluated at this point, the benchmark model
produces a welfare gap equivalent to 0:188 percent of consumption, or about $90 per person.
It is clear that the welfare gains from commitment can be large, notably for values of b
consistent with the data. But precisely how deep habits enable these gains to emerge is an
open question. To shed light on the matter, recall that habit formation, because it aects the
intertemporal spending decisions of households as well as the optimal price-setting behavior
of rms, imposes separate restrictions on the demand and supply-side components of the
structural model. Of course, both sets of restrictions inuence the policy trade-os that
16Optimal discretion does not produce a stable equilibrium in the deep habits model when b > 0:94.
17When b = 0 neither preference nor technology shocks create trade-os for the government. It follows
that there are no gains from commitment since policy can always achieve the Pareto-ecient equilibrium.
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Fig. 1. The percent drop in consumption (  100) sucient to equalize welfare under commitment and discretion is shown
for values of b 2 [0; 0:94]. The solid line corresponds to the deep habits model and the dashed line the aggregate habits model.
Dollar values are found by multiplying  by $48; 674:47, per capita U.S. nominal consumption expenditures in 2014:Q4.
account for the welfare gaps seen in Fig. 1. The basic goal here is to identify which side of
the model plays the dominant role in the sudden growth of these gaps as habits intensify.
To sort out the supply-side eects of deep habits from the demand-side eects, I add to the
gure the relationship between  and b derived from a traditional model of habit formation
in which consumption externalities originate at the level of composite goods rather than
individual good varieties (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003). The comparison is informative
because the externalities present in this model in equilibrium are indistinguishable from those
of the benchmark model even though the underlying structure of consumption habits is very
dierent.18 In fact, one can show that the two arrangements have identical implications for
aggregate demand. The result is that (M-1){(M-3) are exactly the same in both models.
Where they dier is with regard to aggregate supply. As discussed in Givens (2015), the
shadow value of sales described by (M-4) simplies to ^t =  (  1)m^ct when the composite
18After aggregating across goods and households, the period utility function will be the same regardless
of whether composite or dierentiated goods are habit-forming. Details can be found in the appendix.
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good is habit-forming but not dierentiated goods. Substituting this expression into (M-5)
produces the canonical New Keynesian Phillips Curve, ^t = Et^t+1 + ((   1)=)m^ct, that
links ination to current and expected future marginal cost (e.g., Gal and Gertler, 1999).
All other aspects of the model, including the policy objective function, are equivalent to
the benchmark deep habits specication.19 It follows that any discrepancy in the value of 
across models should be attributed solely to the supply-side eects of deep habits.
The dashed line shows the welfare dierential for the comparison model, referred to in
the gure as the \aggregate habits" model. Here estimates of  are uniformly smaller and
far less sensitive to changes in the habit parameter. For b = 0:65, the gap between discretion
and commitment is worth 0:0034 percent of consumption, or $1:68 per person. Increasing
b all the way to 0:94 raises  to just 0:0208 percent, or $10:10 per person. At this point,
the value of  implied by the deep habits model exceeds that of the aggregate habits model
by an amount equal to $380:27. Thus one can conclude that the gains from commitment
seen in the benchmark analysis, particularly for large values of b, are principally the result
of the supply-side inuences that deep habits impart on the economy. The gains attributed
to demand-side eects per se appear modest by comparison.
4.2 Volatilities
Although welfare analysis points to sizable gains from commitment in the deep habits model,
it is not yet clear how these gains manifest in terms of the volatilities of the target variables
in (10). To that end, Fig. 2 plots standard deviations of ination ^t, the output gap y^t  y^et ,
and the habit-adjusted gap x^t   x^et for values of b along the unit interval. Moments are
reported for both the commitment (solid lines) and discretionary (dashed lines) equilibria.
Results conrm that in the presence of deep habits, most of the gains from commitment
emerge in the form of lower ination volatility. The left panel reveals that under discretion the
standard deviation of (annualized) ination swells to nearly ten percent as b approaches its
upper limit. Switching to commitment in this case can reduce ination volatility by upwards
of eight percentage points. For less extreme values, say 0:65 to 0:85, the drop in volatility is
still signicant, ranging from about one percent on the low end to nearly four percent on the
high end. By contrast, commitment generally increases the volatility of the two output gap
variables. When b = 0:85, for example, moving from discretion to commitment raises the
standard deviations of y^t  y^et and x^t  x^et by about 0:2 percentage points. Thus compared to
19Leith et al. (2012) prove that (10) is also the correct approximation to expected utility when households
form habits strictly over the aggregate nished good.
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Fig. 2. Standards deviations of ^t (annualized), y^t   y^et , and x^t   x^et obtained under commitment (solid lines) and discretion
(dashed lines) are graphed for values of b 2 [0; 0:94].
discretion, commitment delivers lower ination variability with only slightly higher output
gap variability. The utility gain associated with the former outweighs the losses tied to the
latter, so the net eect on social welfare is strictly positive (and increasing in b).20
4.3 The Phillips Curve
That ination volatility turns out to be lower under commitment is not surprising given the
well-known stabilization bias of discretion. Instead, what jumps out from Fig. 2 is that the
bias grows exponentially larger as habits intensify. Why the model produces such a result,
however, is still not entirely clear. Comparisons made in section 4.1 suggest that the answer
lies in understanding the aggregate supply implications of deep habits. In what follows I
take a closer look at how these supply-side factors shape the policy trade-os associated with
commitment and discretion that give rise to the stabilization outcomes depicted in Fig. 2.
The aggregate supply component of the linearized model is summarized by (M-4) and
(M-5). These two equations together govern the dynamics of ination ^t and the shadow
value of sales ^t. Scrolling forward (M-4) and substituting the resulting expression into (M-5)
produces a Phillips Curve consistent with deep habits that takes the form
^t = Et^t+1   1

(
b
1  by^t   Et
1X
j=0
(b)j (br^t+j + [(1  b)  (1  b)]m^ct+j)
)
; (12)
20Under the benchmark calibration, the \weights" given to (y^t   y^et )2 and (x^t   x^et )2 relative to ^2t are
0:0085 and 0:0667, respectively. A unit reduction in ination volatility therefore has a much bigger impact
on welfare than unit reductions in output gap volatility.
16
where r^t denotes the real interest rate (i.e., r^t  R^t   Et^t+1).
Equation (12) is dierent from the canonical New Keynesian Phillips Curve in ways that
are fundamental to the stabilization bias and corresponding gains from commitment reported
earlier. The biggest dierence is that the forcing process for ination depends on current
and expected future values of the real interest rate in addition to marginal cost. As a result,
policy-induced changes to r^t+j have a direct supply-side eect on ination, the magnitude of
which is evidently increasing in b. The intuition here is straightforward. Suppose that agents
expect policy to tighten in the future. All else equal, the anticipation of higher interest rates
increases the amount by which rms discount future prots. This lowers the value of sales
^t, giving rms an incentive to raise prices.
21
Notice that the supply-side eects of policy vanish in the absence of deep habits. Setting
b = 0 eliminates all but one of the forcing variables in (12), current marginal cost, and
reduces the Phillips Curve to its canonical form, ^t = Et^t+1+(( 1)=)m^ct. In this case
management of ination works solely through the familiar demand-side channel whereby
adjustments to the policy rate aect marginal cost by shifting the demand for real output.
Returning to (12), it is clear that the supply-side eects of deep habits undermine the
government's ability to stabilize the economy against shocks to ination. Consider, for
example, eorts to tighten policy when ination is above target. Here increases in the policy
rate drive m^ct+j lower but r^t+j higher. That is to say, the demand and supply-side eects of
policy push ination in opposite directions.22 The extent to which these two eects oset,
however, depends on the degree of habit formation. For small values of b, the extra ination
created by the supply channel is negligible. But as b increases, the inationary eects of a
higher interest rate oset more and more of the disinationary eects of lower marginal cost.
Now it turns out that these adverse supply-side eects are easier to manage with commit-
ment than with discretion for the simple reason that adjustments to the real interest rate are
generally smaller under the former. To be sure, the typical response to high ination under
commitment, as documented by Woodford (2003) and many others, is to increase the real
interest rate for a length of time that persists beyond what is actually needed to bring ina-
tion back down to target. By committing to a persistent response, the government succeeds
21The link between prices and future prots is what Ravn et al. (2006) refer to as the intertemporal eect
of deep habits. Subsequent research has shown this eect to be the dominant supply-side channel through
which deep habits aect ination dynamics in sticky-price models (e.g., Ravn et al., 2010; Lubik and Teo,
2014; Givens, 2015). Thus the contribution it makes to the stabilization bias is likely to be signicant.
22The presence of an osetting interest rate term in the Phillips Curve can also be derived from a model
that imposes a working capital constraint on rms (e.g., Ravenna and Walsh, 2006). As shown by Demirel
(2013), failure to account for this constraint causes one to underestimate the welfare gains from commitment.
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Fig. 3. Responses to a one-percent positive preference shock a^t (top row) and a one-percent negative technology shock z^t
(bottom row) are drawn for the real interest rate and ination under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
Impulse responses displayed with (without) x-markings correspond to b = 0:80 (b = 0:65). The real interest rate and ination
are both expressed as an annual percent. Their long-run mean values are calibrated to 3 and 2:75 percent, respectively.
in lowering expectations of future ination. This enables it to rein in current ination with
a smaller increase in the real rate. Under discretion no such persistence occurs. The gov-
ernment is therefore unable to lower ination expectations, forcing it to raise interest rates
by a larger amount over the short run. The key point here is that the interest rate premium
observed under discretion puts additional upward pressure on ination via the aggregate
supply channel described above. Moreover, this upward bias to ination only increases with
the value of b, further eroding the stabilization trade-os under discretion.
The policy implications of deep habits can perhaps be seen more clearly in Fig. 3, which
plots impulse responses for ination and the real interest rate to a one-percent increase in the
preference shock (top row) and a one-percent decrease in the technology shock (bottom row)
under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines). Response functions are drawn
for the benchmark value of habits (b = 0:65) and an alternative higher value of b = 0:80.
In all cases the adjustment of the real interest rate is smaller albeit more persistent under
commitment, and in all cases there is less volatility in the response of ination. When
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b = 0:65, for example, ination jumps to 2:85 percent following either of the two shocks
compared to 3:05 percent under discretion.
Relative to commitment, outcomes under discretion are even worse when b = 0:80. After
a preference shock, ination rises to 3:1 percent under the latter but only 2:85 percent under
the former. In fact, with commitment the entire path of ination is barely aected by the
change in b. The same dynamic also plays out following a technology shock. Here ination
surges to 3:5 percent under discretion but just 2:9 percent under commitment. Of course,
the reason why these kinds of disparities occur is well known. In the absence of commitment,
policy has no moderating eect on expectations. The results depicted in Fig. 3, however,
demonstrate something more. As b gets bigger and the supply-side eects of monetary policy
intensify, this inability to harness expectations under discretion becomes increasingly costly.
5 Quasi-Commitment
In assessing the benets of precommitment, the benchmark analysis follows Dennis and
Soderstrom (2006) by computing the welfare dierential between the discretionary and com-
mitment equilibria. While theoretically consistent, these estimates should probably be in-
terpreted as upper limits on the welfare gains that an economy featuring deep habits could
actually experience. The reason is that commitment and discretion represent opposite (and
extreme) modes of policymaking unlikely to be rigidly applied in practice. Recall that under
commitment optimization occurs only once, resulting in a contingency rule that species
how policy will unfold in all future dates and states. Under discretion the government makes
no promises about the course of policy, choosing instead to re-optimize its welfare criterion
anew every period. In truth most policymaking bodies see the importance of honoring past
promises, but they also recognize that occasionally the ex post temptation to revise their
policy commitments will be too great to resist. That is to say, real-world monetary policy
behavior almost certainly lies somewhere between the conceptual boundaries of full com-
mitment and pure discretion. In such an environment, measuring the gains available from
further improvements to the economy's commitment technology requires the use of a broader
class of policies that nest the strict binary framework assumed in the previous section.
The modeling device proposed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), which they call
quasi-commitment, accomplishes just that. In a quasi-commitment equilibrium the gov-
ernment plays the full commitment strategy, but it periodically reneges on this policy by
re-optimizing the welfare function with some xed exogenous probability known to the pri-
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vate sector. Mathematically speaking, the occurrence of policy re-optimizations follows a
two-state Markov process given by
st =
8<:0 with probability 1 with probability 1  :
The government honors past commitments in periods where st = 0 but formulates a new
state-contingent plan whenever st = 1. Full commitment then corresponds to the limiting
case in which the probability  = 1 (i.e., st = 0 8 t) while discretion corresponds to  = 0.
Sliding  along the [0; 1] interval, however, allows the researcher to link these two extremes
by a continuum of policies that dier according to how often contingency plans get revised.
Notice that the value of  also determines the expected duration of policy commitments,
that is the average length of time between re-optimizations. Specically, commitments should
be expected to last (1   ) 1 quarters on average since the draws fstgt0 are independent
and E[st] = 1 . For this reason, the authors suggest that  be interpreted as a continuous
measure of credibility. The logic is clear. As  increases and commitments become more
durable, the probability that the government's current actions match its earlier promised
behavior goes up. Consistency between these two is fundamental to the denition of credi-
bility favored by many in the policymaking community. Indeed, according to Blinder (1998),
\matching deeds to words" is the hallmark of central bank credibility.
In what follows I adopt the interpretation of  put forward by Schaumburg and Tam-
balotti (2007) to examine how marginal increases in credibility aect welfare outcomes in the
deep habits economy. This is dierent than the previous section, which sought to measure
the gains associated with zero-one discrete changes in credibility. The main goal here is to
determine whether the benets of commitment found in the benchmark analysis accrue at
high or low levels of policy credibility. If the latter turns out to be true, that is if the returns
to credibility are decreasing, then short-term commitments may be sucient to avert most
of the ineciencies associated with discretion.
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5.1 The Control Problem
To solve the government's control problem under quasi-commitment, I assemble equations
(M-1){(M-7) in companion form as"
xt+1
GEtXt+1
#
= A
"
xt
Xt
#
+Bit +
"
N"t+1
0
#
; (13)
where xt = [a^t z^t y^t 1 y^et 1]
0 are the predetermined variables, Xt = [x^t y^t m^ct ^t ^t x^et y^
e
t ]
0 are
the non-predetermined variables, it = R^t is the policy instrument, and "t = ["a;t "z;t]
0 are the
i.i.d. innovations.23 Structural parameters appear as elements of A, B, and G. Using the
same vector notation, the quadratic welfare function can be written as a discounted sum of
expected period losses, Lt, which take the form
Lt =
264 xtXt
it
375
0
W
264 xtXt
it
375 = ^2t + (y^t   y^et )2 + (1  b)1  b (x^t   x^et)2 :
Here W is a positive semidenite symmetric matrix that contains the weights attached to
the ination and output gap objectives.24 Ignoring higher order terms and those that are
independent of policy, the approximation in (10) becomes V0   12h1+E0
1P
t=0
tLt.
Following Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), the optimization problem for a policy-
maker designing a new plan at date zero (i.e., s0 = 1) is
~V (x0) = minfitgt0
E0
1X
t=0
tLt s.t. (14)
xt+1   A11xt   A12Xt  B1it  N"t+1 = 0;
(1  st+1) [GEtXt+1   A21xt   A22Xt  B2it] = 0;
where the partitions fA11; A12; A21; A22; B1; B2g are conformable with [x0t X0t]0 and x0 is
given.25 What distinguishes (14) from a standard full commitment problem is that the
lower block of constraints, those involving agents' expectations, do not bind when a re-
23Agents correctly anticipate the probability of future re-optimizations when forming expectations. As a
result, the expectations term in (13) satises Et[Xt+1] = Et[Xt+1jst+1 = 0] + (1  )Et[Xt+1jst+1 = 1].
24Directions on how to construct W as well as G, A, B, and N can be found in the appendix.
25Optimization is cast as a minimization rather than maximization problem after dropping the multiplica-
tive constant,   12h1+, from (10).
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optimization fst+1 = 1g occurs. On these dates, call them fjgj0, the government disregards
expectations formed in earlier periods and announces a new state-contingent plan for the
future.26 Each time the problem is the same, whereby forward-looking constraints are relaxed
in the inaugural period but met thereafter. Thus (14) admits a recursive structure, not
period-by-period, but rather across successive commitment regimes.
The solution to this type of problem can be found by rst summing the losses over each
regime and then applying the recursive saddle-point functional equations described in Marcet
and Marimon (2011). The appropriate Bellman equation in this case is
~V (xj) = maxf'k+1gkj
min
fxk+1;Xk;ikgkj
Ej
8<:
jX
k=0
k
h
Lj+k + 
j+1 ~V (xj+1) (15)
+2'0j+k+1
 
GEj+kXj+k+1   A21xj+k   A22Xj+k  B2ij+k
i9=;
s.t. xj+k+1   A11xj+k   A12Xj+k  B1ij+k  N"j+k+1 = 0; 'j = 0;
where 'j+k+1 are Lagrange multipliers attached to the forward-looking constraints. Note
that these multipliers satisfy the initial condition 'j = 0, signifying the re-optimization that
occurs at the beginning of the jth regime. Over the next j = j+1 j 1 quarters, however,
the constraints involving agents' expectations bind, so the multipliers take on nonzero values.
Since the value function ~V () is dened only in periods fjgj0, when the multipliers are reset
to zero, its sole argument is the vector xj determined in the nal quarter of regime j   1.27
Using the solution algorithms presented in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), I compute
the Markov-perfect equilibrium to the planning problem (15). The equilibrium is one in
which the decision variables [X0t i
0
t]
0 are characterized by policy functions"
Xt
it
#
=
"
FX;x FX;'
Fi;x Fi;'
#"
xt
't
#
: (16)
Within each commitment regime (e.g., j < t  j + j), the relevant state variables
include predetermined variables xt and Lagrange multipliers 't, the latter of which captures
26The date of the jth re-optimization is dened as j = minftjt > j 1; st = 1g with 0 = 0.
27The quasi-commitment problem embodied by (15) can be interpreted as that of a sequence of policy-
makers with terms of random duration who want to maximize a common objective. Each one plays the
full commitment strategy while in oce. But like discretion, policymakers cannot make credible promises
regarding the actions of their successors, nor are they bound by the promises of their predecessors.
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the equilibrium eects of promises made by the current administration in an earlier period.
When re-optimizations occur, however, previous commitments are abandoned and thus 't
gets reset to zero. On these specic dates, fjgj0, the policy functions are therefore given
by (16) but with FX;' = 0 and Fi;' = 0.
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5.2 Results
Having formally stated the quasi-commitment problem, I am now ready to examine the
welfare eects of marginal increases in credibility in the deep habits model. Fig. 4 plots
welfare dierentials between the full and quasi-commitment equilibria for values of  along
the unit interval. The dierentials, denoted V c0   V 0 , are expressed as fractions of V c0   V d0 ,
that is the maximum welfare gain brought about by a jump in  from zero (discretion) to
one (commitment). Normalizing the welfare gaps by V c0   V d0 reveals what percentage of
the maximum gains are achieved from a given level of credibility.29 As in Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2007), I consider values of  belonging to f0; 1=2; 2=3; 3=4; : : : ; 48=49; 49=50g. This set
of probabilities maps into expected regime durations of f1; 2; 3; 4; : : : ; 49; 50g quarters.
It is clear that most of the gains from commitment accrue at low levels of credibility.
According to the gure, commitments lasting just two quarters on average are sucient to
close about 70 percent of the welfare gap between full commitment and discretion. Three
quarters is enough to achieve 83 percent of the total gains from commitment, while roughly
90 percent can be obtained with an expected regime duration of one year. By the two-year
mark, the increments to welfare from unit increases in (1  ) 1 are less than one percent of
V c0   V d0 and become negligible thereafter.
The apparent concave relationship between credibility and welfare seen here suggests that
the ineciencies of discretion, namely those resulting from the stabilization bias, can mostly
be avoided with short-term policy commitments. The marginal welfare gains from long-term
commitments in the deep habits model are small by comparison. These results echo the ones
found by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) as well as Jensen (2013) but contrast sharply
with those reported in Debortoli et al. (2014). The discrepancies in this literature, however,
appear to be driven primarily by dierences in model choice. Where the rst two employ a
28These methods rene earlier work by Roberds (1987). More recently, Debortoli and Nunes (2010) and
Debortoli, Maih, and Nunes (2014) present a similar device, which they call loose commitment, that can be
used to evaluate marginal changes in credibility within a wider class of monetary and scal policy problems.
29Recall from (14) that V0 =   12h1+ ~V0. It follows that (V c0   V 0 )=(V c0   V d0 ) = ( ~V c0   ~V 0 )=( ~V c0   ~V d0 ),
where ~V c0 and
~V d0 denote, respectively, the minimum value
~V (x0) obtained under commitment ( = 1) and
discretion ( = 0). Likewise, ~V 0 is the minimum value
~V (x0) obtained for a given  2 (0; 1).
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Fig. 4. The welfare gap between full and quasi-commitment, expressed as a fraction of the total dierence in welfare between
discretion and commitment, is depicted in the gure for average regime durations (1  ) 1 of f1; 2; 3; 4; : : : ; 49; 50g quarters.
prototype sticky-price model without habit formation, the latter studies quasi-commitment
using the medium-scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007).
The simulations underlying Fig. 4 assume a xed degree of habit formation b equal to
0:65. Whether these results are robust to dierent values of b, notably those in the upper
region of the parameter space where the gains from commitment are largest, remains an
open question. To that end, Fig. 5 re-graphs the welfare dierentials (V c0   V 0 )=(V c0   V d0 )
as a function of b, holding constant (1  ) 1 at either 2, 4, 8, or 20 quarters.
Results show that most of the gains from commitment, be they large or small, accrue at
relatively low levels of credibility irrespective of the degree of habit formation. Commitments
expected to last 8 quarters, for example, achieve no fewer that 90 percent of the total gains
under any permissible value of b. That threshold increases to 95 percent should commitments
average 20 quarters in duration. It follows that there is little benet to extending the period
of commitment beyond a two to ve-year window. Doing so would reduce the welfare gap
between full and quasi-commitment by less than two percent for any b above 0:65.
At the very low end of the credibility spectrum, however, the gains from commitment
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appear somewhat more sensitive to the overall size of the habit externality. Consider, for
example, the case in which commitments are expected to last just two quarters. Here the
welfare decit relative to full commitment increases rapidly as b approaches its upper bound.
Lifting b from 0:7 to 0:8 reduces welfare by an amount equal to 7 percent of V c0   V d0 .
Increasing b to 0:9, however, reduces it by an additional 33 percent. At this point, monetary
policy achieves less than one-third of the maximum gains available under perfect credibility.
The eects of credibility on the deep habits economy can also be seen in the volatilities
of the target variables featured in (10). I demonstrate this in Fig. 6 by plotting the standard
deviations of (annualized) ination, the output gap, and the habit-adjusted output gap for
regime durations of f1; 2; 3; 4; : : : ; 49; 50g quarters.30 Moving from discretion to a quasi-
commitment policy with two-quarter regimes cuts the standard deviation of ination by
almost half, from 1:75 to 0:96 percent. Increasing the duration of commitments to a mere
six quarters brings it down to within 0:1 percentage points of the full-commitment level.
30In computing volatilities, I hold xed the degree of habit formation b at the benchmark value 0:65.
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Unlike ination, however, the output gap volatilities are not monotonic with respect to
credibility. In fact, the standard deviations of y^t   y^et and x^t   x^et reach their highest points
for average regime durations of three and two quarters, respectively. This means that the
welfare gains from commitment, the bulk of which accrue at low levels of credibility, are
being driven entirely by reductions in the volatility of ination.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper evaluates the welfare gains from commitment relative to discretion in an equi-
librium model that gives prominence to deep consumption habits a la Ravn et al. (2006).
Using a second-order approximation of lifetime utility as the welfare criterion, I nd the gains
from commitment to be strictly increasing in the degree of habit formation. For a range of
values consistent with U.S. data (i.e., 0:65  b  0:90), the welfare dierential expressed in
units of consumption is between 0:02 and 0:36 percent. These estimates are equivalent to
$12:02 and $175:38 on an annualized per capita basis. Further analysis reveals that the vast
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majority of the gains can be traced to the supply-side eects that deep habits impart on the
economy. This explains why the switch from discretion to commitment is accompanied by
steep declines in the volatility of ination with little change in the volatility of output.
A nal issue concerns whether the benets of commitment, which can be large for em-
pirically relevant values of b, actually require that the government be able to convince the
public that it will honor policy promises forever. To address this point, I borrow from
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and compute the quasi-commitment equilibrium of the
deep habits economy for dierent levels of credibility. Together, these equilibria occupy the
policy space between pure discretion and full commitment. Results show that most of the
gains identied in the benchmark analysis can be achieved with low-to-moderate credibility,
meaning that short-term commitments are generally sucient to preclude the ineciencies
of discretion. This nding may provide insight into why central banks appear so concerned
with their credibility. In the present model, if policymakers have relatively little to begin
with, surrendering even a small amount can have a sizable impact on welfare.
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